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INTRODUCTION

You may not have heard of institutional doxing, but you should be
afraid of it. Institutional doxing is a new concern arising from the invention
of the Internet. The advent of the Internet in 1989 led to the development of a
blinding array of new technology, none more striking than the World Wide
Web.1 According to the World Bank, in 2019 over fifty percent of the world’s
population had regular access to the Internet, amounting to billions of new
cyberspace citizens.2 While there are notable advantages of an increasingly
digital society, increased digitalization has also made society more
vulnerable.3 Some of the most prevalent dangers are cyberattacks, specifically
institutional doxing.
Many high-profile cases involving institutional doxing made
international headlines in recent years.4 These cases include the wellpublicized hacks of Ashley Madison and Sony.5 “[T]he most famous ‘dumps,’
such as those released by Edward Snowden, the Sony hackers, and the Ashley
Madison hackers, have become household names.”6 The Sony Hack gained
notoriety due to its public attribution to North Korea.7 In the Sony Hack, the
“North Korean government stole and published gigabytes of corporate email
from Sony Pictures. This was part of a much larger doxing — a hack aimed
at punishing the company for making a movie parodying the North Korean
leader Kim Jong-un.”8
Institutional doxing attacks are increasingly dangerous according to
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, who announced that
cyberattacks surpassed terrorism as the number one threat facing the U.S.
today.9 Cyberattacks, such as doxing, impose “increasing costs to our
businesses, to U.S. economic competitiveness and to national security.”10
1

A Short History of the Web, CERN, https://home.cern/science/computing/birthweb/short-history-web (last visited Sept. 9, 2021).
2 INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION, https://www.itu.int/en/ITUD/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2021).
3 Bruce Schneier, The Meanest Email You Ever Wrote, Searchable on the Internet,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 8, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/09/organizational-doxing-ashleymadison-hack/403900/.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Colin J.A. Oldberg, Organizational Doxing: Disaster on the Doorstep, 15 COLO. TECH.
L.J. 181, 183 (2016).
7 Schneier, supra note 3.
8 Schneier, supra note 3.
9 Aaron Boyd, DNI Clapper, Cyber bigger threat than terrorism, FEDERAL TIMES (Feb. 4,
2016), https://www.federaltimes.com/management/2016/02/04/dni-clapper-cyber-biggerthreat-than-terrorism/.
10 Id.
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Consequently, “[a] legal framework for attribution would provide a critical
stepping stone for enabling a regime to restrict and redress the harms of statesponsored cyber-attacks” and make the Internet a safer place.11
However, there are two primary reasons why international law lacks
a reliable attribution method for state-sponsored institutional doxing.12 First,
the nature of doxing renders treaties and agreements typically used for
attribution ineffectual, and there are limited alternatives to identify, prosecute,
and remedy cybercrimes.13 Second, the lack of remedy is compounded by the
general lack of consistent and effective attribution in international law. 14
Treaties, agreements, and best practices that have built the basis of
international law attribution procedures are riddled with gaps. 15 These gaps
can be ascribed to ambiguous attribution practices and inadequate
international law relating to cybercrimes.16
To resolve institutional security concerns, the international
community must address institutional doxing and the growing international
threat to security. This Note will analyze how international law should address
the threat and will proceed in four parts. Part One defines institutional doxing
and summarizes its increasing dangers. Part Two introduces the international
law of attribution. Part Three examines potential methods of attributing
institutional doxing to guilty states and evaluates several treaties, agreements,
and best practices within international and domestic law to determine if any
satisfy international security needs. If no adequate solutions exist in
international or domestic law, privatized attribution procedures will be
scrutinized to determine if they can protect the interests of the institutions
vulnerable to doxing. Part Four further evaluates the most promising solution
and identify potential implementation issues. This Note concludes that the
issue presented by institutional doxing and a lack of reliable attribution
methods in international law would be best resolved by privatizing attribution
procedures. Large multinational corporations, which are often the target of
institutional doxing attacks, are often unprepared for both cyberattacks and
attribution procedures that follow them.17 In practice, these large
multinational corporations have failed to efficiently attribute doxing

11

Delbert Tran, The Law of Attribution: Rules for Attributing the Source of a CyberAttack, 20 YALE J. L. & TECH. 376, 381 (2018),
https://yjolt.org/sites/default/files/20_yale_j._l._tech._376.pdf.
12 Kristen Eichensehr, The Law & Politics of Cyberattack Attribution, 67 UCLA L. REV.
520, 524 (2020).
13
Id.
14 Id.
15 John Billinger & Matthew Waxman, Filling Gaps in International Law, LAWFARE
(Feb. 4, 2021, 10:21 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/filling-gaps-international-law.
16 Eichensehr, supra note 12.
17 Michael Joseph Gross, Enter the Cyber-Dragon, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 2, 2011),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/09/chinese-hacking-201109.

GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L.

214

[Vol. 50:211

perpetrators.18 However, before this Note can properly analyze solutions, it
must first contextualize institutional doxing and its underlying dangers.
II.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

A. Introduction to Institutional Doxing
Doxing is a damaging and malicious form of cyberattack that is
increasingly common as our world digitalizes.19 Doxing is generally defined
as the act of publishing private information, such as credit card numbers,
addresses, phone numbers, medical information, or private communications.20
Not all publishing of private information is doxing.21 Notably, a key
distinction between doxing and general cyberattacks is that the objective of
doxing is mainly harassment, not whistleblowing. 22 This Note defines doxing
as the act of weaponizing private information against an individual,
institution, or state with an intent to harass or harm.
While doxing is becoming increasingly common, it is certainly not
new.23 Doxing is a subtype of online vigilantism that has existed since the
origin of the Internet.24 Doxing, “originally a slang term among hackers for
obtaining and posting private documents about an individual, usually a rival
or enemy” has existed on the Internet for decades.25 However, doxing was
originally a smaller-scale operation, consisting of “little black-hat hacker
crews who were at war with each other — they would take docs, like
documents, from a competing group and then claim they had ‘dox’ on them.”26
Over time, doxing attacks evolved into massive hacking operations that

18

Id.
Bruce Schneier, 2015: The year “doxing” will hit home, BETA BOSTON (Dec. 31,
2014), http://www.betaboston.com/news/2014/12/31/2015-the-year-doxing-will-hithome/.
20 Id.
21
Id.
22 Bruce Schneir, How to keep your private conversations private for real, WASHINGTON
POST (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/03/08/conversations-onlineare-forever-now-heres-how-to-keep-yours-private/.
23 Id.
24 Nellie Bowles, How ‘Doxxing’ Became a Mainstream Tool in the Culture Wars, THE
NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/technology/doxxing-protests.html.
25 Id.
19

26

Id.
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attacked corporations, law firms, individuals, and intelligence organizations
like the NSA and the CIA.27
Institutional doxing is a subtype of doxing where hackers weaponize
the Internet to collect and share a business organization’s private
information.28 This includes information about customers, employees, board
members, and trade secrets. Like standard doxing, the scale of an institutional
doxing attack can vary. Institutional doxing can fluctuate from a disgruntled
employee sharing a small business’ private emails to large-scale professional
hacks of multi-national corporations. Likewise, doxing technique can vary
from “stealing data from an organization's network and indiscriminately
dumping it all on the Internet” to precise data mining for a targeted attack on
a specific department or project.29 Although institutional doxing attacks may
be conducted with vastly different methods and levels of severity, the
devastating effects on collection and publication of proprietary, secret, or
incriminating data with the intention to intimidate, harass, or humiliate a
business organization remain the same.30
Corporations are increasingly attractive candidates for statesponsored doxing attacks as they increase their size, influence, and economic
force. Many institutional doxing attacks are committed by foreign states – one
scholar notes that “state-sponsored cyber-attacks are on the rise and show no
signs of abating.”31
Some argue that corporations are acting as states in some
capacities.32 It could even be said that corporations act as the modern
equivalent of traditional colonial powers by controlling large areas of
resources and the livelihoods of many people. 33 Large multinational
corporations, especially ones in the technology industry like Google, are
“acting in some ways as nation-states used to act, exercising to the best of
their ability some attributes traditionally associated with sovereign states.” 34
In particular, “Facebook has become so powerful and omnipresent that some
have begun to employ the language of nationhood to describe it.” 35
Corporations’ massive increase in power and influence made their intellectual
property and trade secrets more valuable, making corporations more attractive
doxing targets for foreign states.36

27

Id.
Oldberg, supra note 6.
29 Schneier, supra note 3.
30 Id.
31
Tran, supra note 11, at 376.
32 See Bruce Schneier, The Rise of Political Doxing, VICE (Oct.28, 2015, 8:00 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/z43bm8/the-rise-of-political-doxing.
33 Gross, supra note 17.
34 Id.
35 Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C.L. REV. 1807, 1808 (2012).
36 See Gross, supra note 17.
28
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The relationship between business organizations and states is
growing increasingly complex and will continue to evolve. This evolution will
likely increase the amount and importance of interactions between states and
corporations and increase the likelihood that they will clash on these issues.
Therefore, as anti-corporate activism and targeted political sentiment grow,
doxing is an increasingly popular and dangerous tool in the modern cyberarsenal of states that should not be underestimated.37
The advent and continued practice of institutional doxing is a
testament to the increased weaponization of information. Doxing’s prevalence
demonstrates that “information has value — particularly information related
to people’s identities, interests and habits.”38 “Doxing ultimately, makes data
into a weapon.”39 As we enter “the age of big data,” data is being recorded on
an unprecedented scale.40
Many people share versions of themselves daily on Facebook,
Instagram, and Twitter. Likewise, they have private conversations with others
through Gmail accounts and Zoom calls. The companies people use to stay
connected store accumulated personal data. It is “almost a given that you have
personal information available online. Beyond social media and online
discussion boards, there are public records of property ownership and voter
registration, as well as massive databases of financial information assembled
by credit-rating agencies.”41 The storage and maintenance of this personal
data allows hackers to use doxing as a weapon. 42 One scholar who researched
the risks associated with doxing attacks described that:
[i]t often feels like everyone is collecting our personal
information. Smartphone apps collect our location data.
Google can draw a surprisingly intimate portrait of what
we're thinking about from our Internet searches. Dating sites
(even those less titillating than Ashley Madison), medicalinformation sites, and travel sites all have detailed portraits
of who we are and where we go. Retailers save records of
our purchases, and those databases are stored on the Internet.
43

37

See Schneier, supra note 32.
Jasmine McNealy, What is doxxing and why is it so scary?, THE CONVERSATION (May
16, 2018, 6:26 AM), https://theconversation.com/what-is-doxxing-and-why-is-it-soscary-95848.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Schneier, supra note 3.
38
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The storage of this information also makes people vulnerable to
doxing.44 Those who are aware of the increasingly complete picture of our
lives data can paint also understand its value and its potential as a weapon. 45
Those who intend to use data as a weapon understand that data brokers “have
detailed dossiers that can include all of this and more.”46 The heightened value
of data created an environment that encourages institutional doxing as a
weapon and intensifies the harm that doxing can cause.
Corporations can suffer various types of harm from doxing attacks.
Two types of potential harm corporations can suffer from doxing include
embarrassment and negative press. For example, in the Sony Hack, the media
primarily focused on “Sony’s corporate executives, who had sniped at
celebrities and made racist jokes about President Obama. But also buried in
those emails were loves, losses, confidences, and private conversations of
thousands of innocent employees.”47 Though “the press didn’t bother with
those emails—and we know nothing of any personal tragedies that resulted
from their friends' searches” that information will forever remain accessible
to the public.48 Though the aim of the attack was primarily to hurt Sony, its
employees “were caught in the blast radius of the larger attack” not aimed at
them.49
In addition, victims of institutional doxing may suffer financial harm.
For example, Sony’s stock plummeted after the attack, hurting both Sony’s
finances and its investors.50 Doxing attacks cause substantial financial loss,
including costs for “the eventual investigation, consultants, lawsuits, stock
price fluctuations, and more. The entire picture of a major compromise is the
real value, as that is where companies can fully learn of the risks of a
breach.”51
Moreover, although corporations and their employees are the most
immediate victims of institutional doxing, institutional doxing also harms
customers. Since massive quantities of:
our data is connected to the Internet, and stored in corporate
networks, we are all in the potential blast-radius of these
attacks. While the risk that any particular bit of data gets
published is low, we have to start thinking about what could
44

Oldberg, supra note 6.
McNealy, supra note 38.
46 Schneier, supra note 3.
47 Id.
48
Id.
49 Id.
50 A Breakdown and Analysis of the December, 2014 Sony Hack, RISK BASED SECURITY
(Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.riskbasedsecurity.com/2014/12/05/abreakdown-and-analysis-of-the-december-2014-sony-hack/.
51 Id.
45
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happen if a larger-scale breach affects us or the people we
care about. It's going to get a lot uglier before security
improves.52
For those with sensitive information stored on corporate servers, the
consequences of an institutional doxing attack can be life changing. The
image below is the communication customers of Ashley Madison, a website
for married men and women seeking affairs, received after hackers seized
their information in an institutional doxing attack on Avid Life Media, the
parent company of Ashley Madison.53 When Avid Life Media did not take
down Ashley Madison permanently in all forms the hackers released all
customer records, including personal profiles with all the customers’ secret
sexual fantasies, matching credit card transactions, real names, home
addresses, and employee documents and emails. 54

Although some users paid a fee for a “full delete” button, which,
upon triggering, would remove any trace of their account, the attack showed
that Ashley Madison was not actually fully anonymous and that the full delete
button did not function as claimed. 55 Due to the doxing and release of

52

Schneier, supra note 3.
Kim Zetter, Hackers Finally Post Stolen Ashley Madison Data, WIRED (Aug. 18, 2015, 5:55
PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/08/happened-hackers-posted-stolen-ashley-madison-data/.
54 Id.
55 Oldberg, supra note 6, at 184.
53
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sensitive personal information “people committed suicide, and countless lives
were ruined.”56
Furthermore, institutional doxing attacks may even harm those who
had no relationship with the victimized corporation. 57 Examining the Ashely
Madison Hack, doxers released false information along with the real user
records. 58 As Ashley Madison's sign-up process did not require email
verification to set up an account, some members of the site hijacked
legitimate email addresses on the site. 59 For example, one of the hijacked
email addresses in the data dump belonged to former UK Prime Minister,
Tony Blair. 60
Further, the risk of forged documents being included in doxing
attacks is a growing concern. Russia recently began using forged
documents in several disinformation campaigns—particularly relating to
Sweden joining a military partnership with NATO and Russia’s 2014 invasion
of Ukraine.61 While forging thousands of documents is difficult to
accomplish, slipping a single forgery in a collection of real documents is more
subtle.62 One scholar theorizes that:
Maybe a country that anonymously publishes another
country’s diplomatic cables wants to influence yet a third
country, so adds some particularly egregious conversations
about that third country. Or the next hacker who steals and
publishes email from climate change researchers invents a
bunch of over-the-top messages to make his political point
even stronger. Or it could be personal: someone dumping
email from thousands of users making changes in those by a
friend, relative, or lover.63
As shown by the Ashley Madison, Sony, and Russian campaigns, the
damage done by institutional doxing attacks can be widespread and severe.
States that engage in or sponsor doxing attacks must be stopped. However,
perpetrating states must first be identified and held accountable. Therefore,
56

Id.
Kim Zetter, Hackers Finally Post Stolen Ashley Madison Data, WIRED (Aug. 18, 2015),
https://www.wired.com/2015/08/happened-hackers-posted-stolen-ashley-madison-data/.
58 Id.
59
Id.
60 Id.
61 Bruce Schneier, Organizational Doxing and Disinformation, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY
(Sept. 14, 2016, 6:21 AM),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/09/organizational_1.html.
62 Id.
63 Id.
57
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immediate action must be taken to find a reliable method of attribution for
state-sponsored institutional doxing attacks.
B. Introduction to the Law of Attribution
How is it possible to stop an attacker when you do not even know
their identity?64 The inability to identify and attribute the source of doxing
attacks allows bad actors to launch such attacks with impunity, “frustrating
efforts at creating international laws or treaties to regulate this harmful
behavior.”65 The concept of attribution involves allocating responsibility to a
state for certain wrongful or illegal acts.66 Generally, a party must attribute an
act properly before international law can provide a remedy.67 The importance
of attribution “lies in the simple fact that states as legal persons can only act
through natural persons. Without attribution the state is incapable of acting on
the international plane.”68
A variety of tribunals, state practices, and substantive norms helped
shape international attribution.69 For example, “[a]ttributing responsibility for
cyberattacks to states . . . intersects with secondary international law rules
regarding the evidence states must provide when accusing other states of
internationally wrongful acts.” 70
There are two questions to ask in order to properly attribute a doxing
attack to a state actor. The first question includes the act of attribution, to
determine if the acts are an “(international) act of the State, one which is of
relevance under international law.” Then in the second question, one should
ask if the act is “contrary to international law and therefore an 'internationally
wrongful act of a State.’”71 This two-step approach poses two sets of
challenges. First, it may be difficult to determine which state was responsible
for committing a specific act. Attribution could be complicated by the
technology used in doxing attacks, and more traditional methods of avoiding
responsibility.72 Second, determining if the act was contrary to international

64

Tran, supra note 11, at 6.
Id.
66 Kristen Boon, Are Control Tests For the Future?, 15 MELB. J. OF INT’L L. 1, 2 (2014).
67 Id. at 45-46.
68 Jörn Griebel & Milan Plücken, New Developments Regarding the Rules of Attribution?
The International Court of Justice's Decision in Bosnia v. Serbia, 21 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 601,
602-603 (2008).
69 Id. at 601.
70 Eichensehr, supra note 12, at 523-24.
71 Amina Alijacic, Some Aspects of the Genocide Case and the (non)Achievement of
Transitional Justice, 1 INT’L J. RULE L., TRANSITIONAL JUST., AND HUM. RTS. 28 (2010).
72 Eichensehr, supra note 12, at 528.
65
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law involves additional inquiries relating to the underdeveloped body of
international law.
Despite the existing framework, attribution is “an area of law that is
notoriously underdeveloped even outside the cybersecurity context,” leading
to great difficulty in attributing doxing attacks.73 Doxing attribution has
technical, legal, and political issues involved in the process of assigning
responsibility to the state or non-state actors responsible for an attack.74
Moreover, states may go to great lengths to avoid detection for certain
wrongful acts, making it even more difficult to attribute doxing. 75 Despite
these challenges, a sufficient legal framework for attribution of doxing attacks
is therefore a critical stepping stone to prevent and redress the harms of
doxing.76
III.

METHODS OF ATTRIBUTION

The search for an adequate solution is not without challenges. One
scholar, when exploring this issue, wrote that “borrowing lex generalis from
the non-cyberspace context is hard to do, and lex specialis governing evidence
for cyberattack attribution has not yet crystallized.”77 In other words, general
international law may be difficult or insufficient, and international law
specific to attribution does not exist yet.78 However, as addressed previously,
institutional doxing attacks are increasingly dangerous. This makes finding a
viable attribution method significant.
The motive behind this Note is to discuss potential solutions to some
of the issues presented by institutional doxing. Therefore, this Note will not
analyze all these issues in depth, but rather give a brief overview and discuss
relevant applications.
The search for an effective attribution method for regulating state
practices in cyberspace within existing international law has been
unsuccessful thus far.79 As discussed above, international law regarding
attribution, and specifically cyberspace attribution, is limited.80 This section
will describe and discuss several existing international law tenants and
whether they could be adapted to provide an attribution method for
institutional doxing attacks.

73

Id. at 524.
Id. at 523.
75 See Id.
76 Tran, supra 11, at 5.
77 Eichensehr, supra note 12, at 525.
78 Id. at 524.
79 Id.
80 Id.
74
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First, a solution will be sought in lex generalis. Lex generalis consists
of all general international law regarding attribution.81 Within the confines of
this Note, articles of state responsibility, rule of war, and human rights treaties
will be the primary focus. This Note will analyze and determine if there are
any potentially viable solutions among them. Second, lex specialis, the limited
international law directly applicable to cybercrime attribution, will be
analyzed and a determination will be made if there are any potentially viable
solutions.82 The Tallin Manual 2.0 will be the sole focus of section two.83
Third, this Note will analyze proposed rules, treaties, or regulations
applicable to cybercrime attribution and determine if there are any viable
solutions. While section three will not be a comprehensive analysis of all
proposals, it will focus on several of the most promising proposals.
Fourth, U.S. domestic law will be examined to see if there are viable
domestic solutions that can meet the needs of the international community.
Lastly, private sector solutions will be analyzed, and a determination
will be made if there are any potentially feasible solutions. A combined
private and public sector approach will also be evaluated.
A. Lex Generalis
This section focuses on broad expressions of the international law of
general applicability and will analyze it in the context of doxing attack
attribution. This section covers the largest segment of international law.
Although none of this law will be directly on-point to doxing attacks and
cyber-attribution, it could supply a broad solution that could be tailored to
doxing attacks and cyber-attribution proceedings.
i.

ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts

“In 2001 after nearly four decades of work,” the United Nations
International Law Commission (ILC) adopted its Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles). 84
The Draft Articles are a comprehensive set of rules relating to attribution
procedures.85 Since then, the United Nations General Assembly has
81

Antoine Niedergang, Lex Generalis and Lex Specialis, SPACE LEGAL ISSUES (Nov. 24,
2019), https://www.spacelegalissues.com/lex-generalis-and-lex-specialis/.
82 Id.
83 The Tallinn Manual, CCDCOE, https://ccdcoe.org/research/tallinn-manual/ (last visited
Oct. 1, 2021).
84 Eric Talbot Jensen & Sean Watts, A Cyber Duty of Due Diligence: Gentle Civilizer or
Crude Destabilizer?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1560 (2017).
85 Id.
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commended the Draft Articles to its member states. 86 It is possible that the
Draft Articles have become customary international law, as few objections
have been made.87 Additionally, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 includes the Draft
Articles and relies on them to define rules of state responsibility.88
Though there are different understandings of the “proposed
altogether eight different attribution rules within Articles 4-11 of the ILC
Articles,” they all serve the same overall purpose, which is to calm the debate
surrounding attribution in international law.89 Specifically, the proposed rules
of attribution reference whether individual conduct is attributable to the
state.90 The Draft Articles commentary describes the most authoritative
guidance on the attribution parameters. The commentary to Article 5 of the
Draft Articles “sets out three key conditions that must be satisfied in order for
attribution to arise.” 91 The first condition sets out that the conduct must equal
an exercise of governmental authority.92 The second condition sets out that
the domestic law of the state must authorize the private actor to exercise this
authority.93 The third condition sets out that the actor must be exercising
governmental authority at the pertinent time.94 “These three factors alone
determine the potential attribution of private conduct to the state pursuant to
Article 5, but their practical meanings remain unclear.”95
When applying the Draft Articles to institutional doxing, several
issues immediately appear. While Draft Article 8 gives two examples where
“the conduct of an individual or group of individuals may exceptionally be
attributed to the State in two specific hypotheses,” they are unreliable for
attributing doxing attacks to the responsible states.96 Draft Article 8 states that
individual conduct can be attributed to a state:
(a) if he, she or they were acting “in fact on behalf of the
State”’, i.e.-in the terms of Draft Article 8-if he, she or they
were “in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the

86

Id.
Id.
88Id.
89 Griebel & Plücken, supra note 68, at 603.
90 Santiago M. Villalpando, Attribution of Conduct to the State: How the Rules of State
Responsibility May Be Applied Within the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 5 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 393, 396 (2002).
91
Jennifer Maddocks, Outsourcing of Governmental Functions in Contemporary
Conflict: Rethinking the Issue of Attribution, 59 VA. J. INT'L L. 47, 60 (2019).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 60-61.
96 Villalpando, supra note 90, at 410.
87
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direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct';
or
(b) “if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and
adopts the conduct in question as its own.” 97
While Article 8 seemingly establishes reliable guidelines, it is more
complex in practice. Regarding (a), it is already difficult for the victim to show
that the individual cyber-criminal was state-sponsored and not a rogue actor,
and technology makes this decision more difficult.
Furthermore, to establish state responsibility, the act must not only
be harmful, “it must also amount to a breach of the offending State's
international legal obligations.” 98 Breaches of international legal obligations
must be identified; this may be done either by act or omission.99 “For
responsibility to accrue to the State, the act must be attributable to the State,
either as an act of ‘its organs of government, or of others who have acted under
the direction, instigation or control of those organs, i.e. as agents of the
State.’”100
The Article 8 standard may provide clarity to standards of state
responsibility. However, it is unclear whether the standard alone is sufficient
to attribute cyber-crimes such as doxing to states. First, the Draft Articles have
not given a clear answer to the international attribution problem because they
do not specify the level of state control over an individual that is required for
attribution.101 Second, “to further complicate the issue of cyber accountability,
states do not universally accept that the laws of state responsibility apply to
cyber operations.”102 While most states recognize the laws as applicable in the
cyber domain, the most recent meeting of the UN Group of
Governmental Experts “fail[ed] to reach [a] consensus on the application of
basic principles of international law in this context.”103 The Draft Articles
alone, without amendment or further consensus, would fail to address
institutional doxing.
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Rule of War

The rule of war may apply to doxing attribution. The rule of war is:
[t]he law that governs states and individuals in armed
conflict. The law of war is both a part of international law
that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities and a part of
the law of the United States and of other nation-states that
binds those individuals within its jurisdiction to comply.104
There are two issues to address to see if the rule of war applies to institutional
doxing: (1) if doxing attacks are considered armed hostilities, and (2) if
multinational corporations are state-like enough to participate in war per
traditional international law standards.
Regarding the first issue, doxing attacks are increasingly popular in
many state-versus-state conflicts.105 In response to the rise of cyberattacks,
states started recognizing cyberattacks as attacks.106 For example, “[i]n May
of 2011, the U.S. State Department released the Administration's International
Strategy for Cyberspace, which indicated that the United States would
consider certain cyber attacks as triggering its right to self-defense.”107
Likewise, “China announced the formation of an ‘Online Blue Army’ to
complement its traditional Red Army.”108 Some scholars pose that doxing
attacks on U.S. entities “now come within an analog of the Willie Sutton rule;
that is, they are attacked because they are particularly attractive targets for . .
. nation-states bent on war.”109
However, one issue centers around that “[t]he law governing when
states can resort to force, jus ad bellum, and the law governing states' conduct
during armed conflict, jus in bello, were written with the kinetic realm in
mind.”110 Besides the physical computers used to commit the purely digital
hacks, doxing attacks barely relate with the kinetic realm.
Regarding the second issue, state action against a corporation may be
characterized as an instigation of conflict that the rules of war could be applied
to. Corporations and states share many characteristics, and multinational
corporations act increasingly state-like. Some scholars use the term
104
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“corporatocracy” to describe the state-like evolution of corporations, defined
as “a tripartite financial and political power relationship between
multinational corporations (‘MNCs’), international banks, and
governments.”111
However, corporations, despite their expanding power and scope, are
not recognized like states. In “other salient ways, the analogy runs out. Most
obviously, the companies lack territory, statehood, and sovereignty--key
features of countries. And countries by and large do not recognize the
companies as fellow Westphalian entities.”112 It is widely accepted that “[t]he
law of war is geared toward states” and this is unlikely to significantly change
despite the real-world changes corporations have undergone.113
Lastly, attribution procedures in the rule of war may fail to meet the
needs of institutional doxing, specifically the need to reliably attribute
international doxing attacks. The law of war typically requires states attacking
another state to identify themselves.114 In traditional armed conflict:
it is generally not difficult to identify the state responsible
for an act of war in the real-world. The initial attack may be
a surprise . . . but attributing the attack to a specific state
tends to be a relatively simple process. Military attackers
wear distinctive, uniform clothing and use equipment with
insignias or characteristics indicating their national
affiliation.115
However, identification in the cyber context is extremely technical and may
prove to be more challenging than what traditional standards can meet.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the rule of war provides an adequate attribution
system for doxing attacks due to the covert and varied nature of cybercrime
and the force-driven conceptualization of warfare. Despite its challenges, rule
of war international law is one of the best attribution methods for larger-scale
or repeated attacks. However, that is beyond the focus of this Note.
iii.

Human Rights Treaties

Various human rights treaties may provide attribution procedures that
could apply to doxing attack attribution. Human rights are a subject
extensively covered by international law. “The international human rights

111

Priti Nemani, Globalization Versus Normative Policy: A Case Study on the Failure of
the Barbie Doll in the Indian Market, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 96, 99 (2011).
112 Kristen E. Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 668 (2019).
113 See generally Lobel, supra note 107, at 632.
114 Brenner, supra note 105, at 406.
115 Id.

2021]

INSTITUTIONAL DOXING AND ATTRIBUTION

227

regime has drawn on principles establishing rules of attribution of state
responsibility such that individuals can now invoke those principles in front
of human rights bodies,” various tribunals, courts, treaties, and agreements
developed to address human rights violations and to hold the perpetrators
responsible.116 Examples include the UN Human Rights Committee, the
European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court and
Commission of Human Rights. 117 These organizations have applied an
expansive body of international law, and a possibly useful infrastructure for
doxing attack and cyber-attribution proceedings.118 Existing human rights
infrastructure could apply to cyber-attribution proceedings, or even recognize
cybersecurity as a human rights issue.119
Moreover, there is a growing trend of hearing cases regarding
individuals claiming breaches of states' international human rights
obligations.120 Parallels could be made between the prosecution of war
criminals sponsored by states and cybercriminals employed by states.
However, applying a human rights scheme in the cybercrime context
is unlikely a viable long-term solution. “As criteria differ between general
international law, [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development] standards, the law on state immunity, European human rights
law, and Inter-American human rights law,” it is difficult to determine what
standards apply.121 Moreover, UN member states are in conflict over whether
cybersecurity is a human rights issue.122 While Estonia, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Ecuador, Japan, and Switzerland, among others, have recently
advocated for an “‘open, free and stable cyberspace where the rule of law fully
applies, and human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected’ . . . .
Noticeably silent on rights were the two cyber heavyweights: the US,
which didn’t address the issue, and Russia, which didn’t participate in the
meeting.”123 When the two largest players refuse to even address the issue, it
is unlikely that the human rights framework can provide reliable attribution
procedures.
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Jurisprudence

International courts could provide a method of attribution suitable for
institutional doxing. In particular, the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Commission (IAC), the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) could be looked to as significant indicators of attribution issues
in international law.124 Using international criminal courts to attribute acts is
not new; courts previously provided state attribution.125 The ICJ implements
a distinct approach to international adjudication, providing a model for how
international courts compel states to participate in their systems. 126
For example, following the Iran-Contra Crisis, the United States was
accused of aiding Contra forces in attempting to overthrow the Nicaraguan
Government. To attribute the aid, Nicaragua brought the issue to trial via the
ICJ.127 In the case of Nicaragua v. USA, “the Court had to decide, among other
issues, whether to uph[o]ld Nicaragua’s claim that the United States had
‘devised the strategy and directed the tactics of the contra force, and provided
direct combat support for its military operations.’”128 The issues raised in
cases like Nicaragua can apply to doxing attribution. On a fundamental level,
both involve finding and trying a state for perpetrating bad acts. Moreover,
“[a]s a general matter, the ICJ has broad subject- matter jurisdiction to hear
any international law claim brought before it, so long as it is brought with the
consent of both parties.”129 The ICJ had not heard any disputes regarding
cyberattacks but, these disputes are likely within its jurisdictional scope. 130
These courts and their jurisprudence have set out several tests that
could standardize a method of attribution for institutional doxing attacks. The
ICJ applied two tests in Nicaragua.131 Those two tests were the “strict control”
test and the “effective control” test.132 The “strict control” test is based on
124
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complete dependance, while “effective control” is based on partial
dependance.133 However, the ICJ held that the strict control test was not
persuasive in the case of organized groups.134
In contrast, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) uses the “overall control”
test.135 The “overall control” test was created when “[t]he Appeals Chamber
held that the conduct of the Bosnian Serb armed forces could be attributed to
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on the basis that these forces ′as a whole′
were under the overall control of that State.”136 The “overall control” test
partially discards the ICJ′s ′effective control′s test.137 Lastly, the European
Court of Human Rights has developed the effective overall control test.138
Though all these tests are valuable, they likely fail to meet the needs
of attributing international doxing. There is a distinct “tension between the
need for what has been called ‘real accountability’ of States and the attribution
of responsibility to States only for their own conduct.”139 A more significant
issue is that there is no existing international body for attribution. While the
existing framework would certainly work if applied to a court designated for
attribution, there will likely be issues in creating that body.140 This is troubling
because it suggests that states are only incentivized to create these institutions
when challenges result in disaster.141 While this generalization is not final for
practically implementing attribution law, it does make it less appealing in the
search for a reliable and immediate attribution method.142
B. Lex Specialis
Next, this note will analyze narrow expressions of the international
law of special applicability in the context of doxing attack attribution. In
contrast to lex generalis, this section covers a more specific segment of
international law. Some of lex specialis is directly on-point to doxing attacks
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and cyber-attribution and could apply to doxing attacks and cyber-attribution
proceedings. However, lex specialis is limited in its size and applicability.
i.

Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to
Cyber Operations

The Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Operations (“Tallinn Manual 2.0”) is one of the few on-point pieces of
international law regarding cybercrimes, including doxing attacks. It
represents an attempt to regulate cyberoperations via international law.143
Specifically, the Tallinn Manual 2.0:
offers a comprehensive regulatory scheme (154 rules),
laying out the general legal principles governing
cyberoperations and their interaction with specialized
international law regimes, such as human rights law,
diplomatic law, space law, and telecommunication law.
Most of the Tallinn Rules focus, however, on the interplay
between cyberoperations and the use of force (addressing
both jus ad bellum and jus in bello).144
For the Tallinn Manual 2.0 to successfully regulate cyber-attribution, certain
expansions would have to be made. Chiefly, the Tallinn Manual would need
to become binding law; it is currently not compulsory.145
ii.

Domestic Law to Regulate Doxing Attack Attribution

If there are no suitable attribution methods in international law,
domestic law could serve as an adequate replacement. While this section will
focus on the United States, other states have their own statutory schemes that
could be examined. In the U.S., attribution is governed by U.S. domestic legal
standards.146 This includes federal privacy legislation like the Graham LeachBliley Act (GLBA), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), Federal Information Security Management Act, Fair Credit
Reporting Act, and the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.147 In the U.S., formal
attribution procedures match the federal indictment process, where “[f]ederal
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prosecutors present evidence to a grand jury, which ‘may return an indictment
if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed by the
persons indicted.’”148 A grand jury only need be convinced that there is
probable cause to indict a defendant for an alleged, which is a lower threshold
than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.149 The Supreme Court explained
that probable cause is not an exceptionally high bar; it only requires fair
probability.150 Therefore, the U.S. could attribute certain cyberattacks via
grand jury or other similar bodies under the probable cause standard.
While this standard is reasonable, domestic attribution mechanisms
are unlikely to serve as a viable solution for a variety of reasons. First, the
variance is too great between nation states. While some nations implemented
similar procedures, others are vastly different in protecting the accused. 151
Moreover, there is consensus that:
reliance on varied domestic law standards to govern
attributions is unlikely to generate consensus among states
about how attributions should be made. For issues related to
the permissibility (or not) of state behavior vis-à-vis other
states, there is significant value in having agreed legal
standards. States are coequal sovereigns in the international
system, not usually subordinates governed by each other's
domestic laws. Domestic legal standards--especially
divergent ones--cannot reasonably be expected to generate
cross-national agreement on the bounds of permissible state
behavior any more than disparate policy choices can. That
is the domain of international law.152
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that any state’s domestic law would suitably
replace the international law of cyberattack attribution.
IV.

PROPOSED EXPANSIONS

This section discusses proposed expansions to international law regarding
the law of attribution. As international law continues to evolve in response to
new and updated problems, new proposals will be made, some of which may
serve as adequate solutions to the issue at hand.
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A. Due Diligence
Two international law scholars proposed a potential solution to the
attribution problem, derived from the international law concept of state
responsibility for transboundary harm.153 International law has increasingly
held states responsible for their harmful activities.154 One significant aspect of
state responsibility is international accountability, as state responsibility often
attaches for purposes of litigation, negotiations, or countermeasures.155
Because of this significance, attribution of harmful acts may occur through a
response proxy. A response proxy is “an entity against whom action is taken
when action against a responsible party is not feasible.” 156 By applying due
diligence principles to cyberspace and their relationship to countermeasures
“illustrates an initially attractive solution to the attribution dilemma.” 157 The
authors write that:
Recognizing a cyber-specific obligation of due diligence to
address emanation of such cyber harms might mitigate the
attribution dilemma. That is, a primary rule of conduct
requiring diligent management of territorial cyber
infrastructure could give rise to responsibility on the part of
non-diligent States as proxies for unidentified or
unreachable malicious actors. Legal recognition of such
breaches of diligence permits State victims of cyber harm to
take action to induce compliance and terminate harm without
necessarily tracing attribution to the original, difficult-toidentify source. Such an approach has gained momentum
among both States and commentators.158
Although “due diligence could be an effective tool in justifying the use of
countermeasures in the fight against the difficulties caused by the inability to
attribute harmful cyber acts” it may also worsen the issue.159 If applied too
aggressively, proxy responses may act as counterproductive and create
instability in the international system, as “[a]lthough development of primary
rules of conduct in international law is generally thought to increase stability
and cooperation, recognition and refinement of a duty of cyber due diligence
might impose significant costs to security, stability, and even to international
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law compliance.” 160 Due to the likely instability in implementation, and the
potential pushback from liable parties, a due diligence approach is not
currently the preferred method of attributing doxing attacks.
B. Legalizing Cyberattack Attribution and Evidentiary Standards
Legalizing cyberattack attribution methods in conjunction with clear
evidentiary standards for the attribution process may aid in developing a
procedure to attribute institutional doxing attacks. Several nations including
the U.S., United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands hold that evidencegiving is not currently required for attribution within the scope of international
law.161 While some states practice providing evidence with their allegations,
there is no legal standard that requires providing such evidence.162 “Such
‘trust us’ attributions are problematic for any number of reasons.”163
Attributions without evidence may be incorrect, difficult to corroborate or
debunk due to the lack of supporting evidence, or foster greater consolidation
of blocs with respect to cybersecurity issues.164 However, there are many
potential positive effects of creating an evidentiary standard for cybercrime
attribution as a method of improving institutional doxing attribution.165
While an attribution method is needed, and evidentiary standards are
certainly a necessary component, it is difficult to implement these
standards.166 While there are many positive effects, the negative concerns
outweigh these positive effects. There are distinct downsides to requiring
evidence for doxing attack attribution. First, states may invoke the need to
protect their confidential sources and methods.167 While there are ways to
attribute information without exposing confidential sources and methods,
international evidentiary law would certainly heighten the risk. Second,
“states may fear that a legal requirement to provide evidence would require
more evidence than they currently provide as a matter of policy.”168 Third,
verification problems may present themselves.169 Fourth, progressive
development of law relating to evidence to support attribution may have
positive effects, support stability, and help avoid conflict over cyberspace. 170
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Moreover, setting a strict evidentiary standard may decrease the
overall number of attributions.171 This is undesirable considering the rising
number of institutional doxing incidents that need attribution.
Further, non-state actors involved in the attribution-making process
may refuse to share their sources and will not share those sources without a
body of law to compel them to. Specifically, the victims of institutional doxing
may make attributions, and international law would fail to regulate them
easily as private parties. For example, when previously attributing a
cyberattack to a state, Google refused to show how it acquired information or
disclose any of its attribution methods. Likewise, Facebook stated that to
protect the integrity of its methods and processes, it would not explain how it
attributes attacks.172 Regardless of evidentiary standards for attribution in
international law, private parties reinforced that attribution is not just a state
practice.173
In sum, while the benefit of establishing attribution procedures with
a clear evidentiary standard may provide reliable and accurate results, the
likelihood of persuading private parties to adopt evidentiary rules is unlikely.
Therefore, establishing attribution procedures with clear evidentiary standards
in international law is unlikely the best method going forward.
C. Joint effort: A New Public and Private Entity
Some discussion has revolved around creating a new international
legal body to handle attribution questions. It was initially proposed by
Microsoft in a 2016 White Paper.174 There, Microsoft proposed to create an
international institution for attributing state-sponsored cyberattacks led by a
mix of governmental and nongovernmental actors. Modeled after the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the proposed institution included
technical experts from a variety of governments, the private sector, academia,
and civil society.175 Through the creation of such a body:
Microsoft envisions that the organization would produce a
“technical analysis of the attack and evidence of attribution,”
which
it
would
sometimes
publish. Microsoft
acknowledges that the institution would need representatives
from a ‘diverse set of nation-states and geographic regions,’
171
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including “[a]t a minimum . . . representatives from countries
that are permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council.” The white paper further suggests that attribution
reports ‘can be subject to peer review, improving
the
quality of the results.’176
This model would also serve as an effective endorsement of private entities
performing governmental functions in international law, potentially
encouraging additional cooperation between the public and private sectors. 177
Others proposed establishing a Global Cyber Attribution Consortium
with “broad membership across geopolitical lines to foster a diversity of
perspectives and to minimize the possibility that its findings are tainted by
political influence.”178 Members of this organization could include experts in
cybersecurity companies and academia, including legal, cyberspace, and
international policy experts.179 The University of Washington's School of
Public Policy proposed a similar plan regarding an exclusively private sector
international attribution organization.180
Microsoft’s proposal takes a pragmatic approach. The problem of
attribution may be solved most efficiently by a combination of international
law and private sector action. Or more pessimistically, neither international
law nor the private sector is capable of handling attribution of institutional
doxing attacks on their own, and their cooperation is necessary. Combining
existing international law institutions and forums with the capabilities of the
private sector makes this proposal a viable solution.
However, there are implementation issues that render this option
unusable. Chiefly, all the above-mentioned bodies are merely proposals. No
concrete steps have been taken to make these institutions a reality. While the
proposals may eventually be a viable solution, the international law
community needs immediate action to attribute cybercrime, and the proposals
are still limited to theory.
D. Private-Sector Attribution
It is unlikely that any of the public methods of attribution previously
discussed would address institutional doxing. As outlined above, general
176
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international law attribution methods are unlikely to function adequately, and
there are no effective existing specific attribution methods. Moreover,
domestic law cannot suit the needs of attribution. The lack of viable legal
solutions regarding attribution created a “law-free zone” surrounding
effective cyber-attribution procedures.
The law free zone hinders institutional doxing victims from acquiring
a proper remedy for being doxed. If international law cannot provide an
adequate method of attribution, institutions should privatize the attribution
process to ensure adequate procedure after such attacks. Where law has failed,
the private sector should compensate.
The private sector is growing into the law-free zone. Some scholars
have indicated that “[p]ublic attributions of state-sponsored cyberattacks have
become one of the best sources of information the public has about state
behavior in cyberspace.”181 There are many failures in the international law
of attribution and individual states have at times been hesitant to attribute
attacks because attribution could harm their relationships with other states.
But corporations may lack this inhibition, especially when compensation
incentivizes corporations to attribute doxers.182
For example, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) contracted
the private company CrowdStrike following a July 2015 cyberattack.183
CrowdStrike published the account of its DNC investigation, noting that its:
Incident Response group was called by the Democratic
National Committee (DNC), the formal governing body for
the US Democratic Party, to respond to a suspected breach.
We deployed our IR team and technology and immediately
identified two sophisticated adversaries on the network
– COZY BEAR and FANCY BEAR…. At DNC, COZY
BEAR intrusion has been identified going back to summer
of 2015, while FANCY BEAR separately breached the
network in April 2016. . . [W]e had a high degree of
confidence it was the Russian Government. And our
analysts that looked at it and that had looked at these types
of attacks before, many different types of attacks similar to
this in different environments, certain tools that were used,
certain methods by which they were moving in the
environment, and looking at the types of data that was being
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targeted, that it was consistent with a nation-state adversary
and associated with Russian intelligence.184
Later, the United States Senate issued a supportive report confirming
CrowdStrike’s attribution to Russia.185
Privatization also has the support of some involved in the U.S.
government. In response to a cyberattack on Google’s facilities, “Google
openly asserted its view that the attack originated in China,” and after being
briefed by Google on the allegations, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
issued a statement that said, “[w]e look to the Chinese government for an
explanation.”186 In response to another cyberattack, a former Assistant
Attorney General for the National Security Division testified that “[a] lot of
— outside of any political organization, companies, most corporations, they
often would use these third party contractors, who they hired through their
own counsel, and maximize the control from the point of view of the
victim.”187
The number of former governmental service companies that are
providing private attribution services are rising and will likely continue to
grow.188 All sectors of government, from railways and prisons to militaryrelated activities in combat zones, have increased privatization and
outsourcing.189 The trend is equally evident in cyberspace, where private
actors play a role in upholding cybersecurity and engage in operations on
states’ behalf.190
In fact, corporations started to self-regulate their cyber-activities,191
which suggests they may be able to further regulate attribution procedures.
Specifically, as the culmination of an effort by Microsoft President Brad
Smith, more than sixty tech companies from the United States and Europe
signed a Cybersecurity Tech Accord (“the Accord”). 192 “The Accord commits
the companies to ‘strive to protect all of [their] users and customers from
cyberattacks . . . irrespective of their technical acumen, culture or location, or
the motives of the attacker, whether criminal or geopolitical.’” 193 The
Accord’s signatories also vowed that they would not help governments
conduct cyberattacks against any innocent citizens or enterprises. 194 The
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Accord’s signatories include leaders in the technology industry, such as Cisco,
Microsoft, Facebook, FireEye, Symantec, Nokia, and Telefónica.195
However, one potential risk of privatization is the increasing
influence of corporations on international law. If states routinely dox
corporations, and states respond with private-sector remedies, a method of
punishment for the bad actor in international law still needs to exist. Without
punishing guilty states, the situation could devolve going forward, with megacorporations and states getting involved in conflict, or even all-out war.
Corporations may make wrongful or incorrect attributions, and without
evidentiary standards mandated by international law, they may go
unremedied. Further, though corporations may not share the same political
motivations, they do have some conflicting motivations, including profit.
Google’s post on the notifications explains: “[y]ou might ask how we know
this activity is state-sponsored. We can’t go into the details without giving
away information that would be helpful to these bad actors, but our detailed
analysis- as well as victim reports- strongly suggest the involvement of states
or groups that are state-sponsored.”196 Similarly, Facebook explained that “To
protect the integrity of our methods and processes, we often won’t be able to
explain how we attribute certain attacks to suspected attackers.” 197 While
Facebook and Google’s statements mirror traditional statements by states in
their own attribution procedures,198 these changes are still concerning going
forward.
However, privatizing attribution is still the best option until
international law can adopt to the twenty-first century and create binding law
on cyberattack attribution, against both states and private entities.
Privatizing attribution, at least in the context of institutional doxing
is likely the most realistic solution. Corporations can outsource attribution
quickly and effectively to private companies and then seek remedial measures.
Those private companies will control the process and the substantive
information. Additionally, multiple attributers in both the private and public
sector increases the success rate of public attributions and achieve the desired
goals of attributions.199
V.

CONCLUSION

It is likely that doxing attacks will become more common and more
severe as new technology develops and even more valuable data is stored
online. Reliable attribution methods, whether within international law or in
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the private sector, are necessary for the safety of an increasingly data-driven
world.
Privatized attribution procedures have successfully been applied and
could conceivably be applied on a larger scale to match the threat of future
doxing attacks. While past success is not the sole indicator of future value, it
certainly provides an advantage over theoretical methods of attribution in
international law. Further, privatizing attribution procedures encourage victim
self-help. This could lead to taking additional cybersecurity precautions to
avoid the cost of attribution, which would lower the overall harm of
institutional doxing attacks.
However, it is important to consider that attribution only comes into
play after the damage has already been done. While reliable attribution
procedures are certainly needed to punish offenders and deter potential
cybercriminals, this does little to remedy the harm done to the organization
which had their private information posted publicly, in perpetuity. It is likely
that “[f]orever secrets, like the formula for Coca-Cola, are few and far
between. The one exception is embarrassments. If an organization had to
assume that anything it did would become public in a few years, people within
that organization would behave differently.”200
While reliable methods of attribution are necessary to deter doxing
attacks, corporations should carefully consider what information they collect
and store. It is unlikely that the stored information will remain private for long.
Cybersecurity is recognizing increasingly sophisticated threats and preventive
measures are not always effective. Technology is now fundamentally
intertwined with policy.201 All levels of our society are building complex
socio-technical systems and “[s]oftware constrains behaviour with an
efficiency that no law can match.”202 Technology and policy are changing so
rapidly that getting it wrong can be catastrophic.203 Even if the best attribution
procedures in the world are established, accepted, and utilized; and the culprit
is caught, tried, and punished, the Internet never forgets.
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